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FIRST AMENDMENT-PRISONER RIGHTS AND IMMUNITY FOR
PRISON OFFICIALS
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)
In Procunier v. Navarette,' the Supreme Court held
that prison officials, charged with negligently in-
terfering with a prison inmate's mail,2 had a qual-
ified immunity from suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.3 The Court stated that, in determining
whether a state official had acted in good-faith to
retain his qualified immunity,4 the threshold ques-
tion would be whether the constitutional right
alleged to have been violated was "clearly estab-
lished." The Court, concluding that "there was no
'clearly established' First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment right with respect to the correspondence of
convicted prisoners" 5 at the time the alleged con-
duct occurred, held that the defendants acted in
good faith and so retained a qualified immunity.
6
I
Respondent, Apolinar Navarette was an inmate
at Soledad prison -in California at the time he
'434 U.S. 555 (1978).
2 The officials charged included the Director of the
State Department of Corrections, the Warden and As-
sistant Warden of Soledad, a member of the prison staff
in charge of handling incoming and outgoing prisoner
mail, and four unnamed defendants. The letters alleged
to have been interfered with were to legal assistance
groups, law students, the news media and inmates in
other state prisons, as well as personal friends.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
4 The Court has described the difference between an
absolute immunity and a qualified immunity in proce-
dural terms. Procedurally, an absolute immunity "defeats
a suit at the outset" so long as the act sued upon was
done within the sphere of the official's duties. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.3 (1976); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376, 378 (1951). Whether an official is accorded a
qualified immunity from suit "depends upon the circum-
stances and motivations of his actions as established by
the evidence at trial." Inibler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.3. These
"circumstances and motivations," the basis of a good
faith immunity, will be discussed in section II infra.
" 434 U.& at 563-64.6id.
instituted suit against the prison officials in ques-
tion. During his prison term, Navarette had been
prison law librarian, had participated in a law-
student visitation program and had prepared writs
and pleadings on behalf of himself and other in-
mates. Navarette alleged that from September 1,
1971 to December 11, 1972, prison officials violated
his first amendment right to correspond by confis-
cating and interfering with his mail.7 He further
alleged that the officials, in an effort to hamper his
legal activities, violated his right of access to the
courts by removing him as law librarian and by
terminating a law student visitation program.
8
These violations were alleged to have been com-
mitted either knowingly or negligently. Navarette
sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985.9
The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants as to the first three claims, and
dismissed the fourth through ninth claims for fail-
ure to state a federal claim. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed as to claims one through six. 10 As
to claims one and two, concerning the alleged
deprivation of Navarette's right to correspond, the
court of appeals first held that the interference with
Navarette's mail violated his first amendment
rights. In support of this. decision,* the court cited
7 Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir.
1976).
8 Specifically, Navarette set out nine complaints. Claims
one and two alleged that prison officials deliberately
refused to mail certain letters, or to send others by
registered mail, all in violation of the federal constitution
and the prison's mail regulations then in effect. Claims
four and five alleged that his removal as prison librarian
was designed to punish him for, or hamper him in, his
legal activities, thus depriving him of his right of access
to the courts. Claims three and six alleged that these acts
were committed negligently. Claims seven through nine,
"realleged the substance of claims 1 through 6 anZd sought
to hold the supervisory officials liable upon a theory of
vicarious rather than personal liability." 434 U.S. at 559
n.4.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) details certain conspiracies
interfering with civil rights.
t0 Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir.
1976). The court of appeals agreed with the district court




two Ninth Circuit cases that had indicated that
prisoners retained their rights to free expression
while in jail." The court also relied on Martinez v.
Procunier,12 which had held that the regulations
then governing censorship of prisoner mail in Cal-
ifornia violated prisoners' first amendment rights
to correspond."
The court of appeals determined that prison
officials had a qualified immunity from suits for
damages brought under section 1983, but held that
as Navarette's allegations contradicted the officials'
claims of good faith, it was necessary to consider
issues of fact. This holding precluded summary
judgment."' The court then reversed as to claims
four and five, holding that the removal of Navar-
ette as prison librarian and the termination of the
law student visitation program, because of his legal
activities, violated Navarette's right of access to the
courts.
15
Finally, the court of appeals held that a claim of
"negligent misapplication" of the prison mail reg-
ulations by subordinate officials, and the negligent
training of those subordinates by supervising offi-
cials, resulting in the violation of Navarette's con-
stitutional rights, stated a cause of action urder
section 1983.16 The court cited Monroe v. Pape,7 for
the proposition that section 1983 "should be read
against a background of tort liability that makes a
man responsible for the natural consequences of
his actions..'. Thus, the court of appeals declared
that a deprivation of "fundamental and reasonably
well-defined" rights "need not be purposeful to be
actionable under section 1983."'19
The only question on which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari was "[w]hether [a] negligent fail-
ure to mail certain of a prisoner's outgoing letters
states a cause of action under section 1983?''2D Two
11 McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1974);
Seattle Tacoma Newspaper Guild Local # 82 v. Parker,
480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973).
12 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
'3 However, as the Court in Navareltt pointed out, the
Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974) affirmed the decision in that case on the narrower
ground that the prison regulations violated the constitu-
tional rights of those addressees and senders outside of
prison, rather than the prisoners' themselves. 434 U.S. at
563.




17365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18 536 F.2d at 287 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 180 (1961)).
" 536 F.2d at 281-82.
20 434 U.S. at 559 n.6. The Supreme Court did not
subsidiary issues deemed essential to the Court's
analysis were "whether at the time of the occur-
rence of the relevant events the Federal Constitu-
tion had been construed to protect Navarette's
mailing privileges and whether petitioners knew or
should have known that their alleged conduct vi-
olated Navarette's constitutional rights."2'
Justice White, writing for the Court," agreed
with the court of appeals that state prison officials
possess a qualified immunity from liability in a
section 1983 suit for damages.25 He noted that
Congress, in enacting section 1983, did not intend
a "wholesale revocation of the common law im-
munity afforded government officials."2' However,
unlike earlier Supreme Court cases2 5 where the
Court had accorded a qualified immunity, the
Court here refused to support the extension of this
immunity to prison officials either by specifically
inquiring whether a similar immunity had been
accorded these officials under common law, or
citing public policy demanding that such an im-
munity be granted. Rather, the Court simply pro-
vided a footnote stating that the courts of appeals
have "generally accorded prison and jail adminis-
trators performing discretionary functions a quali-
fied immunity from monetary liability under §
1983." 26
The Court next turned to the standards set out
grant certiorari on the question of whether Navarette's
removal as prison law librarian and the termination of
the law student visitation program violated his right of
access to the courts. The Court also refused to grant
certiorari on the question of "[w]hether deliberate refusal
to mail certain of a prisoner's correspondence in 1971-
1972 prior to Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974),
and refusal to send certain correspondence by registered.
mail states a cause of action for violation of his First
Amendment right to free expression?" Id at 559 n.6
(quoting the petition for certiorari).
21 434 U.S. at 560 n.6.
"The majority included Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.
23 434 U.S. at 561.
24 Id. As the immunity question stood prior to Navarette:
legislators (lenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951));
judges (Pierson v- Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)); and prose-
cutors (Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)) were
accorded an absolute immunity from suits brought under
section 1983. Policemen (Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967)); governors and their principal subordinates
(Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)); school board
members (Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)) and
mental hospital superintendents (O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 US. 563 (1975)) have been accorded a qualified
immunity.
2" See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), and Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967).
26434 U.S. at 561 n.7.
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in Scheuer v. Rhodes27 and Wood v. Strickland,28 stipu-
lating how state officials may retain that immunity.
The Court first noted that under the standard in
Scheuer, the qualified immunity could vary accord-
ing to the "scope of discretion and responsibilities
of the office and all the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared at the time of the action."2
'
The Court then appeared to determine that the
scope of immunity to be accorded these prison
officials was similar to that accorded school board
members in Wood. In so doing, the Court appears
to have reasoned that prison officials, like school
board members, required a degree of immunity
such that they would not be deterred from exercis-
ing their discretion with independence and deci-
siveness, when acting in good faith3
Thus the Court, applying the Wood standard,
held that a prison official could not be considered
to have acted in good faith, and would therefore
lose his immunity if: a) the constitutional right
alleged to have been violated was clearly estab-
lished and the official knew or should have known
of that constitutional right or the official knew or
should have known that his conduct violated the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff; or, b) the
official acted with malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury
to the plaintiff.
3
The threshold question in applying thii standard
was whether the constitutional right alleged to
have been violated was "clearly established. ' ' 2 The
Court held that, in the instant case, it was not. The
Court noted that those cases cited by the court of
appeals in support of its assertion that Navarette
did have a first amendment right to correspond,
were decided after the alleged constitutional viola-
27 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In Scheuer, a case arising out of
the deaths of four students shot by members of the Ohio
National Guard during student protests on the Kent
State campus, the Court held that the Governor and his
principal subordinates were to be accorded a qualified
immunity from suits brought under § 1983. This will be
discussed more fully in section II infa.
2 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood, the Court accorded a
qualified immunity to school board members who were
being sued by students under § 1983 for depriving those
students of due process of law.
2 434 U.S. at 561-62 (quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at
247).
'3 4 3 4 U.S. at 562 (citing Wood, 420 U.S. at 321).
3' 434 U.S. at 562 (citing Wood, 420 U.S. at 322).
3 434 U.S. at 562. The Court, therefore, directly re-
futed the standard set up by the court of appeals which
asked, whether the constitutional right alleged to have
been violated was "fundamental and reasonably well
defined." 536 F.2d at 282.
tion occurred2 3a The Court also noted that while
the Supreme Court did affirm the Ninth Circuit's
finding in Martinez v. Procunier,34 it did so holding
that the prison mail regulations violated the first
amendment rights of those addressees and senders
outside of prison, and not the prisoners themselves.
35
The Court also dealt with those cases decided
before the alleged constitutional violations which
arguably supported Navarette's position. A sharp
line was drawn between the decisions in those cases
and the Court's desire to see an unequivocal deci-
sion on the matter before finding the right "clearly
established. ' ' 6
Holding that the first amendment right to cor-
respond was not "clearly established" either in the
Supreme Court, court of appeals, or district court,
the Navarette Court foreclosed any discussion of
whether the officials knew or should have known
that their act violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff.37 Hence, the Court went directly to the
merits of the officials' affirmative defense, and held
that the prison officials had acted in good faith,
such that they retained their qualified immunity.'
The Court then turned to the second part of the
3 434 U.S. at 563.
3 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
ss Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
36 In Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal.
1970), the district court held that the state could not
prohibit a parolee from speaking at a lawful public
assembly because of the expected content of his speech.
Id. at 751. In Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128,
131 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the court, quoting Coffin v. Rei-
chard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1944), stated that "a prisoner retains all the
rights after ordinary citizens except those expressly or by
necessary implications, taken from him by law." There-
fore, the court in Brenneman concluded that pre-trial
detainees had a first amendment right "to communicate
with friends, relatives, attorneys and public officials by
means of visits, correspondence and telephone calls." 343
F. Supp. at 141. The Supreme Court was quick to point
out that Brenneman limited its holding to the facts before
it: that of pre-trial detainees, who, according to the
Brenneman court, "do not stand on the same footing as
convicted inmates." Id. at 142. Payne v. Whitmore, 325
F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971), held that prisoners had
a first amendment right to receive periodicals and news-
papers. The Court saw this first amendment right as
distinct from the first amendment right to correspond.
"7 434 U.S. at 565.
3 Id. It is interesting to note that Navarette never
alleged that the interference with his mail was violative
of his right of access to the courts even though many of
his letters were to lawyers, law students and the media.
The court of appeals expressed no opinion as to whether
such interference would constitute a violation of his right
of access to the courts. 536 F.2d at 279 n.1. The Supreme
Court also refused to address this issue, noting that
[Vol. 69
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Wood standard to determine if the prison officials
had acted with malice.3 9 Justice White quickly
dispensed with this part of the test by holding that
the Court only granted certiorari on the issue of
negligence. The question of malicious intent was
therefore left unresolved.
After granting the prison officials a qualified
immunity and holding that these officials had
retained that immunity, the Navarette Court finally
addressed the issue on which it granted certiorari:
whether negligence states a cause of action under
section 1983. Justice White, however, avoided an-
swering the question. In a footnote, he explained
that because the case was disposed of on immunity
grounds, the issue of whether a negligent depriva-
tion of a constitutional right states a cause of action
under section 1983 did not have to be addressed.4°
Dissenting, ChiefJustice Burger recognized that
the majority had considered the wrong issue. Ac-
cording to Burger, the question considered should
have been "whether a negligent failure to mail
certain of a prisoner's outgoing letters stated a
cause of action under section 1983"; the question
on which certiorari was granted. He interpreted
the majority's decision as, instead, addressing the
question of whether the petitioners in this case were
immune from suit for damages brought under
section 1983 for the negligent deprivation of a
constitutional right.
4 1
Burger addressed the issue of negligence by first
the issue of whether Navarette's claim was properly
dismissed by the court of appeals.
41
Burger addressed the issue of negligence by first
complaining that he did not understand exactly
what was alleged by Navarette. Burger was not
sure whether the negligence was in the officials'
inability to understand the prison mail regulations,
or in their confiscating the mail because they were
mistaken as to its nature.4 2 Nevertheless, Burger
concluded that as "neither the language nor the
legislative history of 1983 indicated that Congress
Navarette was foreclosed from asserting such a claim as
the claim was dismissed with prejudice in an earlier phase
of the case. 434 U.S. at 565 n.12.
434 U.S. at 563.
40 at 563 n.14.
41 Id. at 567 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). This confusion
of issues appeared to Burger as a departure from the
Supreme Court Rule 23 (1) (c). This rule stipulates that:
"only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly
comprised therein will be considered by the Court." Nor
did this case, according to Burger, fit into one of the
exceptions to this rule. See R. STERN & E. GRassAN,
SUPREME CoURT PRAcrim 297 (4th ed. 1969).
42 434 U.S. at 567 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
intended to provide remedies for negligent acts,"
the section 1983 defendant must "exhibit deliber-
ate indifference to the risk of causing" a constitu-
tional injury to be held liable." Burger did not,
however, substantiate this assertion.
Justice Stevens, also writing in dissent, attacked
the majority for granting the qualified immunity
without carefully considering whether there was
common law precedent for extending the immu-
nity, and for failing to establish carefully the scope
of the immunity." Stevens saw this practice as a
continuation of the trend established in O'Connor v.
Donaldson,' where the Court had also refused to
support the extension of a qualified immunity to a
mental hospital superintendent through the use of
either common law precedent or policy considera-
tions. Stevens felt that by automatically assuming
that prison officials had the same immunity as
school board members, and by failing to stipulate
clearly whether the officials under review had dis-
cretionary or ministerial functions,4 the Court was
indicating that the type of job a state employee
had was irrelevant to the question of whether he
should be accorded a qualified immunity.47 This,
Stevens pointed out, was contrary to the Court's
practices in the past.48
Assuming that negligence does state a cause of
action under section 1983, Stevens examined
whether the prison officials acted in good faith.
Stevens based his theory upon the broader princi-
ples underlying the standards set up in Scheuer and
Wood."9 To Stevens, the "heart of a good faith
defense is the manner in which the defendant has
carried out his job.'5° To retain this immunity, the
official must "believe he was acting within the
sphere of his official responsibility."'51 Stevens' rea-
soning then followed the route opened by Scheuer.
By varying the scope of the qualified immunity
according to the degree of discretion and respon-
sibilities of the office holder, Stevens allowed for
an extension of this immunity to all state officials. 2
However, in the spirit of Scheuer, Stevens appears
to have insisted that officials with different degrees
43 I at 568.
'" Id at 568-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
46 As will be pointed out in section II, infia, the Court
appears to have kept the ministerial-discretionary dis-
tinction intact.
47 434 U.S. at 569 n.3. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48 IA at 569.
491,d at 570-71.
50 Id at 570.
5'Id at 571.
52 Id at 569.
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of discretion be held to different standards for
retaining their immunity.53 Thus, those officials
"without policymaking responsibility ... [could]
establish their defense by showing that they abided
by the institution's regulations or by its long-fol-
lowed practices."5 On the other hand, the upper-
level official would be expected to know whether
his actions, including the regulations he promul-
gates, violate the constitutional rights of his
charges.55
As a lower-level official could present a good
faith defense and achieve immunity by showing
that he abided by the institution's regulations,
Stevens' reciprocal proposition was that the im-
munity could be lost by showing that a lower-level
official disregarded those regulations. Conse-
quently, taking Navarette's allegations as true, Ste-
vens determined that if the lower prison officials
were found to have negligently disregarded the
prison mail regulations, they would not be able to
establish that they had acted in good faith.56 Fur-
thermore, Stevens disregarded the fact that the
Court had granted certiorari on the negligence
claim only, and Stevens addressed the issue of
malice under the second part of the Wood standard.
Assuming Navarette could prove his allegations,
Stevens noted that the confiscation of Navarette's
mail as punishment for his legal activities would
constitute an intent to "cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights, or other injury,"57 thus de-
feating a claim of good faith. Moreover, according
to Stevens, a jury might find that the officials'
"animus toward Navarette ... tainted their han-
dling of his mail" and so caused their negligence.5'
Stevens continued his inquiry as to whether the
defendants exhibited bad faith by declaring that
while Navarette's first amendment right to corre-
spond was not "clearly established" in 1971, the
right of access to the courts was. Therefore, the
prison officials should have known that they were
violating this right by interfering with Navarette's
mail, as many of the letters were addressed to law
students and legal aid groups. Stevens explained
that while Navarette could not bring suit under
section 1983 for the deprivation of this. right, he
could still use the violation as indicative of the
defendants' lack of good faith.59 Thus, Stevens
53Id at 571.54 id.55 Id.
6 Id at 572.
57 Id (citing 420 U.S. at 322).
ma 434 U.S. at 572.
9 Id at 573-74.
believed that the prison officials might in fact have
acted in bad faith and concluded that the Court




Given the Court's failure to provide detailed
support for its decision to extend a qualified im-
munity to prison officials, it is necessary to distin-
guish those characteristics that the official under
review must possess to be accorded a qualified
immunity and to determine the scope of the im-
munity. In earlier section 1983 cases, the Court
focused on three characteristics, or indicia, in de-
termining whether and to what extent a qualified
immunity should be extended. The Court consid-
ered the official's need to rely on information gath-
ered from traditional sources within his organiza-
tion; to assess a variety of options in making com-
plex and subtle decisions; and to make these deci-
sions swiftly. All three of these factors, individually
and in combination, are elements in ascertaining
the degree of discretion exhibited by the official in
his daily decisions.
The Court first used these factors in Pierson v.
Ray.6' There, an interracial group of ministers sued
a judge and two policemen under section 1983 for
false arrest and imprisonment. 62 The Supreme
Court held that the judge who convicted the min-
isters was absolutely immune from suits for dam-
ages brought under 198 363 and the policemen were
entitled to a qualified immunity. The Court deter-
mined that the Congress did not intend to destroy
6Ol11 at 574. Stevens appears to have separated the
issue of whether an official has acted in good faith from
the issue of whether the defendant can be liable for
violating the constitutional right in question. However,
in reviewing the Court's previous § 1983 cases, it appears
that bad faith must be established by showing that the
defendant intended to deprive the plaintiffof the specific
constitutional right being sued upon, or by showing that
the defendant should have known that his actions vio-
lated that particular right. Thus, contrary to Justice
Stevens' notion, it appears that in a § 1983 suit, the
question of whether or not the defendant acted in good
faith soas to retain his immunity, and the question of
whether the defendant was liable for actually violating
the plaintiff's rights, are one and the same.
61 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
6 The ministers were arrested while trying to enter a
"white only" waiting room in an interstate bus terminal
situated in Mississippi. They were convicted for refusing
to obey a police order to disperse after the police had
determined that the ministers' presence was a potential
source of violence. After their conviction was reversed on




the common law defenses to false arrest of good
faith and probable cause with the passage ofsection
1983. Without this defense, the Court reasoned
that the officer, who must quickly decide whether
or not to make an arrest, would be in the position
whereby he either neglected his duty where prob-
able cause existed, or made the arrest only to be
dragged into court by a subsequently vindicated
defendant."' Thus, it was the discretion involved
in having to decide swiftly whether or not to make
an arrest which prompted the Court to accord
policemen a qualified immunity.r5
The Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes66 used a similar
rationale in extending a qualified immunity to a
governor and his principal subordinates.67 In
Scheuer, the personal representatives of the estates
of the four students killed at Kent State sued the
Governor of Ohio and various other state officials
under section 1983 for "intentionally, recklessly,
willfully and wantonly" causing an "unnecessary
deployment" of the National Guard on the campus
which resulted in the deaths.68 The Court, having
Pierson as precedent, noted that the decision to
employ the guard to quell civil disorder was one
that had to be made, "swiftly and firmly," from
"virtually infinite" choices, in a time of "confusion
and ambiguity. ' 69 Moreover, as these decisions
were based-on information supplied by lower-ech-
elon employees the officials were prey to the prob-
lems inherent in relying on information gathered
by others.70 The Scheuer Court realized that as these
decisions were more complex and more subtle than
those made by lower-level officials, it was obvious
that top-level executive branch officials required
an even greater degree of discretion than lower-
level officials such as policemen.7 ' Thus, the Court
constructed the concept of a "varying scope" of
immunity. The variation was determined, in part,
by the degree of discretion and responsibility ex-
hibited by the official.72 In varying the scope of the
6' Id. at 555.
.Id. Accord, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
66 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
67 Id. at 247.
68 Id at 235.
69 Id at 246-47.
7 Id. at 246.
71 Id at 247.
72 Id The standard set out in &Iheuer noted that:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available
to officers of the executive branch of government,
the variation being dependent upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all
the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at
the time of the action on which liability is sought to
immunity to accord with the degree of discretion
exhibited by the higher level official, the Court
constructed a subjective standard for determining
whether the official retained his immunity. Thus,
it was the "existence of reasonable grounds for the
belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good faith,"73 that
formed the basis of this immunity.
By further varying the scope of the immunity,
the Court, in Woody. Strickland,7' was able to exiend
a qualified immunity to an official exhibiting less
discretion. In Wood, three students who claimed
that their rights to due process of law were violated
by their expulsion from public school, had sued the
individual school board members under section
1983.Ts In extending a qualified immunity to the
school board members, the Court again supported
its extension of the immunity and determined its
scope, by comparing the duties of the defendant
officials with those factors indicating the degree of
discretion required by those officials.76 The Court
reasoned that a school board member, having to
"judge whether there have been violations of school
regulations and if so, the appropriate sanctions for
the violations"77 required some degree of discretion
and therefore a qualified immunity of comparable
scope.78 Sensing that the scope of this immunity
should be less than that accorded a high level
official of the executive branch, the Court stipu-
lated that:
a school board member is not immune from liability
for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within
be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds
for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief,
that affords a basis for qualified immunity for acts
performed in the course of official conduct.
Id at 247-48.
73 Id at 247-48.
74 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
75 The students were expelled for violating a school
regulation prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicat-
ing beverages at school or school activities. Id at 310.
"The Court noted that school board officials must
rely on "traditional sources" for gathering information,
and analogized between the executive branch official
faced with civil disorder and the school official having to
reach a prompt decision upon confronting disruptive
student behavior. 420 U.S. at 319.
m The Court concluded that a school board member
faced with this type of discretionary decision, like police-
men and governors, would be deterred from exercising
his judgment with independence and decisiveness if he
was not granted some type of immunity from monetary
suits. 420 US. at 320.
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his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other in-
jury.,
Unlike the more subjective standard set up in
Scheuer, the Wood standard was at once both sub-
jective and objective,so as the "standard of conduct
[was] based not only on permissible intentions, but
also on knowledge of the basic unquestioned con-
stitutional rights of his charges."'' Thus, either
malice or an "ignorance or disregard of settled
indisputable law''m would serve as bad faith under
the standard.ss
While the Court in Wood hinted that it was
limiting its extension of this qualified immunity to
the "specific context of school discipline, ' m the
extension of this immunity to a mental hospital
superintendent in O'Connor v. Donaldson ,aS estab-
lished that the Wood standard was applicable to all
officials whom the court felt required such protec-
tion. Surprisingly, Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, never supported his opinion by citing either
common law or policy considerations. Conse-
quently, O'Connor has been cited as indicating that
the Court, in granting a qualified immunity, will
not distinguish between those officials having dis-
cretionary functions and those having ministerial
duties.86 This does not appear to be so clear, how-
ever, for while the O'Connor case was before the
court of appeals, that court recognized that mental
hospital superintendents do exercise some discre-
79 420 U.S. at 322.
80 The Court noted this in Wood, 420 U.S. at 321, and
commented: "The disagreement between the court of
appeals and the district court over the immunity standard
in this case has been put in terms of 'objective' versus
'subjective' test of good faith. As we see it, the appropriate
standard necessarily contains elements of both."
8' 420 U.S. at 322.
82Id. at 321.
8 This semi-objective standard basically states that
bad faith can be no more than a type of negligence, for
under tort law, a person who has exercised his own best
judgment may still be negligent if his behavior is outside
the norm of ordinary prudence.
84 420 U.S. at 322.
ss 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In O'Connor, a former mental
patient claiming that he was not dangerous to himself or
anyone else, sued the official who would not grant his
release for damages under § 1983. The defendant claimed
"he was acting pursuant to state law, which he believed
authorized [the] confinement" and thus was acting in
good faith. The Court remanded the case to the court of
appeals to reconsider O'Connor's claim in light of the
standard set out in Wood.
86 Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1976).
tion.8 7 Furthermore, it does not appear that Justice
White, in Navarette, believed that the distinction
was dead, as he made sure to note that the officials
involved therein were prison officials with discre-
tionary functions.a
With this precedent before it the Navarette Court
was able to justify extending a qualified immunity
to prison officials in the manner it did. Scheuer and
Wood indicated that an official's scope of discretion
would determine the scope of that official's im-
munity. Wood also established a standard for offi-
cials exhibiting a lower degree of discretion than a
top ranking executive branch official. O'Connor rec-
ognized that the Court was determined to extend
this immunity to more state officials in the future
and indicated that the Court need not spell out
what factors were considered in according the im-
munity as had been done in earlier section 1983
cases. Thus, all that remained in the way of deter-
mining who was to be accorded this immunity,
were the policy considerations discussed in the
Court's earlier section 1983 cases and the stipula-
tion that for an official to be accorded a qualified
immunity he must, at the very least, have a discre-
tionary function. As the Court in Navarette stipu-
lated that the officials involved had discretionary
functions, and as it had assumed that their degree
of discretion was similar to that of the school board
members in Wood, the Court, it seems, believed
that those policy considerations discussed in Pierson,
Scheter and Wood continued to support the decision
made in the present case. Consequently, the Court
might have felt that the mere citing of court of
appeals decisions that had already accorded an
immunity to such officials, was enough support for
its decision. so
III
The extension of a. qualified immunity to some
prison officials seems warranted and logical. How-
' Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.
1974). While the defendant in O'Connor did not have to
make quick decisions of as complex a nature as did the
police in Pierson or the officials in Scheuer, he did have to
exhibit some discretion in his job. While before the court
of appeals, O'Connor pointed out that superintendents
of mental institutions are empowered to release patients
when in their ownjudgement these patients are no longer
in need of confinement. The court of appeals did not
refute the fact that O'Connor's job entailed elements of
discretion but ruled that for an immunity to be accorded,
the officer must have a discretionary function and act in
good faith.
88 434 U.S. at 561 n.7.
89 One case in particular, Hoit v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598
(1st Cir. 1974), appears to have considered the character-
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ever, Justice White in Navarelle might have more
clearly noted that the officials under review had
discretionary functions by pointing this out in the
text instead of in a footnote. This was especially
true in this case as Justice Stevens, dissenting,
indicated that there was some question whether or
not one of the officials accorded an immunity had
the ministerial function of bagging and delivering
prisoner mail.90 In light of O'Connor, White's care-
lessness adds to the confusion over whether or not
officials with ministerial functions are to be ac-
corded a qualified immunity. Moreover, instead of
giving only' a vague idea of the scope of their
discretion with reference to several court of appeals
cases that had already accorded prison officials a
qualified immunity, an analysis similar to that
employed by the Court in Pierson, Scheuer, and
Wood, would have been more appropriate.
The Navarelle Court, in extending the qualified
immunity to prison officials having discretionary
functions, could have followed its steps in Scheuer
more closely by setting up a sliding scale of im-
munity, varying according to the scope of discre-
tion needed by the particular official. This was the
position endorsed by Justice Stevens.9' This ap-
proach would have meant that the Court could
not only have distinguished between a prison ad-
ministrator and a school board member, but that
the Court could have also distinguished between
the different prison officials involved in this case.
For instance, the Director of the State Department
of Corrections surely employs a different scope of
discretion in carrying out his tasks than does the
prison official in charge of handling incoming and
outgoing mail.
However, it should be noted that the standard
advocated by Justice Stevens does two things. First,
it softens the Wood standard because ignorance
istics of the position of prison warden in according the
immunity. For instance, the court stated that; "A prison
warden, charged with controlling an unwilling popula-
tion aided by perhaps an inadequate number of guards,
faces the most demanding and delicate decisions as to the
nature and extent of the sanctions he should impose and
the timing and effect of their removal". It. at 601.
Moreover, the court recognized that a warden must often
act swiftly to control "impending disturbances which
might overtax the control capacity of a prison." Id. at
600. Consequently, it is possible that the Navareuc Court,
rather than looking at the factual situation in the case
before it, looked at the nature of the job as described by
the court of appeals in deciding that prison officials
should be accorded a qualified immunity.
90 434 U.S. at 569 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9' See text accompanying note 54 supra.
could now be offered as a defense.s For instance,
a lower-level official could follow regulations and
never know that he was in violation of the Consti-
tution. Secondly, while the standard requires a
higher degree of knowledge of basic constitutional
rights from upper-level officials, as the type of
decision to be made becomes more subtle and
complex and the circumstances more chaotic, the
standard of reasonableness becomes more vague.
Hence, as to his knowledge of the "unquestioned"
constitutional rights, an upper-level official would
be expected to be more knowledgeable than his
subordinates, while the parameters establishing
whether a lower-level official acted reasonably, are
better defined.
The Navarette Court's assertion that a constitu-
tional right must be "clearly established" before an
official can be expected to know that his action
violated that.right, is well supported by earlier
Supreme Court cases.93 However, the Court, in
placing so much emphasis on the issue of clarity
may unnecessarily have invited difficult decisions
in the future. The Court in Woodseemed to indicate
that the phrases, "settled indisputable law" and
"unquestioned constitutional rights," were synon-
ymous with the phrase, "clearly established."94Jus-
tice Powell, dissenting in Wood, criticized the ma-
jority rule established because it held the school
board member to the responsibility of knowing the
answers to very normative questions. Requiring a
knowledge of "settled indisputable law" and "un-
questioned constitutional rights," was, to Powell,
not "likely to be self-evident to constitutional law
scholars-much less the average school board
member."95 The Court in Navarette hints at an even
more arduous task, in that the clarity of a right
may be evaluated by reference to the opinions of
the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, or the
district courts.o
Finally, it is hard to understand why the Court
granted certiorari on the issue of whether negli-
gence can serve as a cause of action in a section
1983 suit, but never answered the question. In
skipping over this question to address the question
of immunity, Justice White seems to have assumed
that negligence can state a cause of action under
92 See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22. The Wood standard
expects a knowledge of "basic, unquestioned constitu-
tional rights," and this does not appear to leave room for
ignorance at any level.
9 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557; Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
94 420 U.S. at 321-22.
9 Idt at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
96 434 U.S. at 565.
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section 1983. In his analysis of the immunity ques-
tion, White relied, in part, on the good faith stan-
dard established in Wood. That standard makes
both malice and "ignorance or a disregard of set-
tied indisputable law," an act in bad faith.97 Ig-
norance of what one is expected to know is surely
a form of negligence. Thus, the court in Kneely v.
Bensinger98 interpreted the Wood standard as the
Supreme Court's way of insuring that "careless
disregard or negligent ignorance of clear constitu-
tional rights and duties would not be insulated
from liability."'
Moreover, Chief Justice Burger's assertion in
Navarette that Congress did not intend to provide
remedies for negligent acts also appears to be in-
correct. 1 ° Upon examination of the language of
section 1983, it seems that the statute does not limit
the causes of action that may be brought under it.
Where the statute talks of "subjecting" or "caus-
ing" the deprivation of a constitutional right,'0 ' the
statute does not say how one is subjected or how
the defendant is to cause the injury. The statute
speaks only of results. Furthermore, in Monroe v.
Pape,10 2 the Court addressed the issue of whether
section 1983 acted to remedy the deprivation of a
constitutional right caused by a state official's
abuse of his position. The Court, in determining
the type of action which might be brought under
section 19 83 ,i
3 juxtaposed the 1983 statute with
that of 18 U.S.C. § 242, which was examined in
Screws v. United States.1°4 The Monroe Court stated
that since section 242 imposed criminal penalties
for acts "wilfully" done, this meant that a defend-
ant had to intend specifically to deprive a person
of a constitutional right. The Court stated that,
"[w]e do not think that gloss should be placed on
1979 [now section 1983] . ... The word 'wilfully'
does not appear in § 1979. Section 1979 should be
read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural conse-
97420 U.S. at 321.
93 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975).
9 Id at 725.
'00 434 U.S. at 567-68 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
'0'42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
102 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
'03 Id. at 170.
'04 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
quences of his actions."' ° Consequently, it seems
arguable that a plaintiff alleging the deprivation
of a "clearly established" constitutional right
should be able to bring a negligence claim against
a state official under section 1983.
CONCLUSION
With Navarette, the Court has continued to ex-
tend the good faith qualified immunity to all levels
of government officials. However, the Court still
appears to distinguish between those officials with
ministerial duties and those exercising discretion.
It will be interesting to see if Justice Stevens can
convince the rest of the Court to return to Scheuer
and Wood, and construct new standards for differ-
ent officials exercising different degrees of discre-
tion. In so doing, it would be helpful if the Court
clearly delineated those factors which determine
the scope of an official's discretion, as it did in
Pierson, Scheuer, and Wood.
Faced with a clearly established constitutional
right, the Court appears ready to entertain the
question of whether negligence can state a cause of
action under section 1983. The Court in Navarette,
while leaving the question unresolved, seemed to
hint that negligence could be a cause of action
under section 1983 by skipping over that issue to
address the claim of immunity. The language of
the statute apparently leaves room for such a cause
of action and the Court's previous interpretation
of section 1983, in Monroe v. Pape, acknowledged
that intent was not a requisite element in a 1983
suit. Thus, the Court has the tools to decide the
question and the apparent inclination to say yes.
Finally, it should be clear from Navarette, that for
a plaintiff to bring suit against a state official under
section 1983, he must make sure that the right
alleged to have been violated is "clearly estab-
lished." Failure to so allege will end a 1983 suit
before a court has even entertained evidence as to
what the defendant should have known or whether
he exhibited any malice. As it is difficult to tell
exactly what constitutes clarity in this regard, it
should be expected that this issue will be the subject
of important future litigation.
'0 365 U.S. at 187.
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